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Does individual-level exposure to political violence prompt conciliatory attitudes? Does 
the answer vary by phase of conflict? The study uses longitudinal primary datasets to test 
the hypothesis that conflict-related experiences impact conciliation. Data was collected 
from Israeli Jews, Palestinians, and Protestants and Catholics in Northern Ireland. 
Across both contexts, and among both parties to each conflict, psychological distress and 
threat perceptions had a polarizing effect on conciliatory preferences. The study highlights 
that experiences of political violence are potentially a crucial source of psychological 
distress, and consequently, a continuing barrier to peace. This has implications in 
peacemaking, implying that alongside removing the real threat of violence, peacemakers 
must also work towards the social and political inclusion of those most affected by previous 
violence. 
Keywords: Exposure to political violence, psychological distress, threat perception, 
conciliatory attitudes, Northern Ireland conflict, Israeli-Palestinian conflict 
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The past two decades – and particularly the period since 2001 – have seen a large number 
of studies examining the effects of terrorism and political violence on political attitudes.  
Some studies have shown that experiencing higher levels of terrorism increases 
individuals’ tendency to vote for right-wing candidates and to engage in risk-seeking 
behaviors.1 The bulk of these studies examines the impact of political violence and 
terrorism at the level of the general populace.  For example, experiences are measured at 
the community or national level and the consequence of these communal experiences 
assumed to predict individual sentiment.  It is much rarer for respondents to be asked about 
their direct exposure to political violence, whilst also being questioned about their attitudes 
and perceptions.  This has meant that studies have not always been able to take into account 
the participants’ own individual suffering as a result of the conflict.2  
 That said, the sufferings of individuals directly exposed to prolonged conflict are 
likely to create psychological scars as well as societal ones. An emerging body of  studies 
now show an impact of individual-level exposure to political violence (EPV) on several 
political attitudes, including: support for combatants in Afghanistan3, support for 
exclusionism4 or intragroup retaliation in Israel5, conservatism in the United States6, 
perceptions of intergroup threat in Northern Ireland7, and right-wing voting and risk-
seeking behaviors.8 To date the effect of EPV on attitudes towards reconciliation and peace-
building has received little to no attention. This study is based on the premise that mental 
health is key to understanding the impact of conflict on peace/war attitudes (e.g., 
conciliatory attitudes).  This study breaks new ground by utilizing an original comparative 
dataset from four groups with EPV – Israeli Jews, Palestinians, and Protestants and 
Catholics in Northern Ireland. The study offers important insights into two of the most 
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glaring case studies of violent protracted conflicts; both of which, though at different 
conflict-phases, fall short of attaining a stable peace. Uniquely, this comparative analysis 
benefits from a longitudinal design, allowing for the testing of causal claims about the 
impact of EPV at time 1 on time 2 attitudes to peace and compromise. Harnessing the 
power of this longitudinal design, the study controls for prior (time 1) attitudes and tests 
the direct impact of EPV on subsequent political attitudes (time 2). 
 
Exposure to Political Violence and Conciliatory Attitudes 
Convergent evidence suggests that political violence has many costs.  As well as testing 
the hypothesis that EPV is linked to attitudes concerning peace and compromise, this paper 
considers two consequences of EPV that are frequently viewed separately.9 Literature on 
the mental cost of EPV is well established in psychology and psychiatry, as is the attitudinal 
consequence of violence in political science.  Recently, scholars have begun to integrate 
the political and psychological foundations of conflict, with social psychologists utilizing 
the study of emotions10, societal norms11, racial prejudice12, identity13, and terror 
management theory.14 Empirical work by Hirsch-Hoefler et al.15, suggests that 
psychological constructs such as psychological distress and threat perceptions may be 
important drivers of the relationship between EPV and civilians’ willingness to 
compromise for peace and support for diplomatic negotiations aimed at ending a prolonged 
conflict. Similarly, Lyall, Blair, and Imai16 found that individual-level outcomes were key 
micro-foundations of conﬂict in the Middle East.  
Despite these recent studies, scholars are still in the dark as to how EPV inﬂuences 
conciliatory attitudes in different phases of the conflict process. In the context of prolonged 
Running Head: Psychological Barriers to a Peaceful Resolution 
5 
 
conflicts, garnering support for conciliatory policies is exceptionally challenging. It is 
therefore imperative that studies further explore the processes that act as either pathways 
or barriers to peace-building. The current study empirically examines the possibility that 
individuals exposed to political violence in intractable conflicts are likely to adopt more 
intransigent attitudes due to the effects of psychological distress and threat perceptions. 
Psychological distress is a well-established mental-health consequence of EPV. Associated 
symptoms include heightened anxiety, depression, and subjective insecurity. 
Unsurprisingly, the severity of psychological distress tends to rise with the severity of the 
EPV, as reflected in the extent to which the victim experiences disruption, loss, injury, or 
the death of a loved one.17 Threat perceptions, while related to psychological distress, is an 
independent construct which can be seen to operate in situations of political violence at 
least, at the group level. Threat perceptions refer specifically to appraisals of danger posed 
by the “other,” or out-group, because of one’s group identity. Therefore, though the distress 
may be experienced individually it arises due to perceptions of in-group security and as a 
result of identification with that group (i.e., sociotropic threat).18 Psychological distress and 
threat perceptions can arise from acute incidents of political violence, such as NYC 9/11, 
Madrid 3/11, London 7/7, or Oslo 7/22,19 as well as from repeated violence over prolonged 
periods.20  
Perceptions of threat may differ across the group’s party to the conflict and across 
time in any given conflict. Available studies seem to be unable to sufficiently or precisely 
determine the political effect of individual-level EPV across different conflict settings.21 
Most studies were carried out during ongoing conflict or post-conflict periods. Therefore, 
they fall short of providing a comparative perspective of the effect of EPV on conciliatory 
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attitudes during different phases of the conflict process, and what impact this may have on 
the prospects for peace-making. This study resolve this shortcoming by addressing a key 
theoretical question: What does looking at two phases of conflicts in tandem teach us about 
the broad consequences of conflict exposure and the prospects for future conflicts and 
peace negotiations?  By examining two conflicts in different phases at the same time, the 
study is able to gain insight into the impact of EPV at different phases of conflict, and its 
broader impact on conflict resolution. 
During peace-building, cease-fires and political agreements may weaken existential 
security threats; but the legacy of violence and animosity embedded in the collective 
identity and fostered by long-lasting psychological distress22 can powerfully maintain the 
perception of threat from the rival. Even during post-agreement phases of peace-building 
these perceptions may be transformed into symbolic threats to collective identity, and its 
social and political manifestations.23 Therefore it is expected that high levels of 
psychological distress and threat perception will persist in both minority and majority 
groups, regardless of the phase of the conflict. Given the asymmetrical power relations in 
both conflicts, the minority group would feel their security threatened by the majority 
group. On the other hand, the majority group would also experience increased threat 
perception, especially during times of increased conflict. It is hypothesized that this is a 
result of the psychological distress garnered from the potential loss of symbolic and 
material resources due to the conflict.   
  In essence, the study argues that at any stage of the peace-building process, 
perceptions of threat resulting from psychological distress can evoke conflict-supporting 
beliefs which can function as group-level threat buffers. Thus, individuals who have been 
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exposed to political violence may be less supportive of conciliatory policies throughout the 
process of peace-building.  
In short, the study hypothesizes that across both contexts (i.e. an ongoing conflict 
vs. post-conflict), and among individuals on both sides of each conflict (i.e. minority group 
vs. majority), psychological distress and threat perceptions will mediate the (negative) 
relationship between EPV and conciliatory attitudes. The research model is presented in 
Figure 1.  
Figure 1 about here 
 
Violence and Peace-Building in Israel/Palestine and Northern Ireland 
This study draws on unique longitudinal data from two regions where EPV has been both 
substantial and prolonged, namely Israel/Palestine (IL-PA) and Northern Ireland (NI) 
conflicts. Over the past two decades, the two conflicts have been coupled together in the 
literature as classic examples of protracted, intractable ethno-national conflicts.24 Both 
began turning toward peace-building during the 1990s, but where NI reached a conflict 
settlement (though it continues to confront challenges to building sustainable peace), the 
IL-PA conflict is still in a pre-agreement phase, oscillating between escalation and de-
escalation.  
Northern Ireland’s conflict between British Protestants and Irish Catholics had 
claimed over 3,500 fatalities by the turn of the century, more than half of them civilians,25 
and over 30,000 civilians were injured between 1969 and 2003.26 Many people continue to 
live with long term disability and poor health as a consequence of the conflict, and few 
citizens have not been personally affected by it to some degree.27 The peace-building 
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process in Northern Ireland has taken a rocky road. The highly-acclaimed Belfast (Good 
Friday) agreement, which symbolically ended the conflict in 1998, was partially suspended 
for several years until several major difficulties were overcome in 2010.28 Although levels 
of violence dropped dramatically following the Belfast agreement, memories of past 
atrocities remain powerful, occasionally threatening the fragile political arrangements and 
the reconstruction of social relations. 
In IL-PA, the 1993 Oslo Accords failed to evolve into a lasting peace agreement, and 
political violence continues to affect the lives of both Israeli Jews, and Palestinians. Since 
2000 alone, 6,580 Palestinians have been killed by Israeli security forces, and 1,097 Israeli 
Jews have been killed by Palestinians29 - the latter mostly through suicide bombings during 
the Al Aqsa Intifada in 2001. Even during periods of negotiation, Palestinians experience 
the daily stress of occupation, and Israelis are constantly vigilant of suicide bombings or 
rocket attacks. This takes its toll on ordinary individuals’ mental and physical health,30 with 
heightened levels of distress and threat perceptions present in both populations.31  
In choosing these two conflicts, this study examines the consequences of EPV on 
conciliatory attitudes in a comparative perspective on different phases of peace-building 
following intractable conflict (Figure 1). The power of this comparative study is enhanced 
by the representativeness of its samples in both location and the cross-conflict context, 
which enables it to generalize our results. Additionally, the longitudinal data permit causal 
and inferential analyses about the impact of political violence on conciliatory attitudes 
across time. 
Research Design and Method 
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The study captures the political effect of EPV by examining four groups: Israeli Jews 
(N=167), Palestinians (N=124), and Protestants (N=61) and Catholics (N=68) in Northern 
Ireland. 
Sample and Procedure 
In the Israeli Jewish sample interviews were conducted by an experienced, computerized 
survey institute in Israel using trained telephone-survey interviewers. The response rate 
among eligible responders was 53%. This compared favorably with studies in the U.S., 
especially given that the dialing methods in Israel, unlike the U.S., include business phones 
(approximately 10%), which cannot be removed and are treated as failed attempts, and that 
the higher rates in U.S. studies typically do not include non-answered phones.32 Those who 
agreed and were available were surveyed again approximately six months later (80% re-
interview rate). 
The Palestinian sample was based on adult Palestinians living in the West Bank, 
Gaza Strip, and East Jerusalem. We employed a stratified 3-stage cluster random sampling 
strategy. First, 60 clusters were selected with populations of 1,000 or more individuals 
(after stratification by district and type of community – urban, rural, and refugee camp) 
with probabilities proportional to size. Next, 20 households in each of the chosen clusters 
were selected. The third stage involved selecting one individual in each household using 
Kish Tables (these tables provide within-household randomization of participants). After 
complete description of the study to the participants, written informed consent was 
obtained and they were paid the equivalent of about $5 USD. Of the original sample, an 
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attempt was made to reach the 999 people who agreed to be contacted at 6-month follow-
up. This sample yielded a response rate of 89%. 
In the NI sample, respondents in Wave 1 were recruited face to face in respondents’ 
homes, using a paper-based questionnaire. A quota sampling mechanism was employed 
that considered the levels of violence experienced in the electoral ward, the religious 
composition of its residents, as well as levels of deprivation.33 Additionally, although the 
study refers to the ‘Northern Ireland’ sample, and uses as its main point of contrast 
‘Catholics’ and ‘Protestants’, it must be acknowledged that the process of labelling 
categories has had a contentious and complicated history during the conflict and 
subsequent peace. As Whyte34 discusses, although principle distinctions in NI are often 
made on ethnoreligious background, the conflict is over national jurisdiction (with 
Unionists supporting NI within Britain and Nationalists arguing for the claim of the 
Republic of Ireland). Whilst the religious and political orientations of the population are 
roughly synonymous (Protestants/Unionist/British and Catholic/Nationalist/Irish) this can 
lead to a minority of Catholics and Protestants taking non-typical political positions.35  
Measures  
A closed-ended questionnaire was designed to incorporate four measures: EPV, 
psychological distress, threat perceptions, and conciliatory attitudes. Due to the different 
contexts, we have used slightly different items, however all scales were previously 
validated and tested. To overcome possible weaknesses in the cross-conflict comparison 
caused by the different conflict settings we kept, for each variable, the original context 
and meaning so that the answers will reflect the original meaning of the respondents.  
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Individual-level exposure to violence (EPV) was assessed using three items 
previously utilized by Lyall and colleagues.36 Respondents were asked whether they had 
experienced any of the following conflict-related events: (1) the death of a family member 
or friend; (2) witnessing an attack or being present at a site where there were injuries or 
fatalities; and/or (3) injury to oneself, a family member, or a friend. Responses were coded 
as 0 (“Not exposed to any of these events”) or 1 (“Exposed to at least one event”). In the 
NI sample, the above three items were broken up into seven specific items to enhance the 
likelihood of recollection. As the final measures here too were dichotomous variables, the 
measures pertain to the exact same construct. The respondents were asked whether they 
had experienced any of the following conflict-related events: (1) caught in a bomb 
explosion; (2) caught in a shooting; (3) caught in a riot; (4) a witness of violent acts against 
others; (5) injured as a result of any incident; (6) affected by serious handicap/injury; (7) 
bereaved as a result of The Troubles.37 Responses were coded 0 if all seven items were 
answered “No” (i.e. “Not exposed to any of these events”), or 1 if any of the items received 
a “Yes” (i.e. “Exposed to at least one event”). As one kind of EPV does not necessarily 
preclude another, internal reliability was not calculated. 
Psychological distress was assessed using a 17-item scale of posttraumatic stress 
symptoms. This format demonstrated 86% sensitivity and 78% specificity when compared 
to clinician interviews (PSS-I). 38 It has been used in non-Western, low income regions,39 
and within the Israeli (including both Palestinians and Jews; Hobfoll et al., 2006) and NI 
populations previously.40 Respondents were asked to report on the frequency of symptoms 
over the preceding month either in the context of The Troubles in Northern Ireland or the 
violence in the Israeli-Palestinian context, respondents were asked about symptoms such 
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as experiencing repeated dreams or nightmares. Scores were calculated as the average of 
all 17 responses. As the response scales for the various samples differed, the answers of 
each respondent were normalized to a score on a scale from 0 (“Not at all”) to 1 
(“Extremely frequent”). Cronbach’s alpha for the scale in the current study was 0.87 for 
Israeli Jews, 0.84 for Palestinians, 0.96 for Catholics, and 0.96 for Protestants.  
Threat perceptions were measured based on studies conducted in the United 
States,41 Northern Ireland, and the IL-PA context,42 using items related to the most 
pertinent current and future threats at the national level.43 For Israeli Jews and Palestinians 
the study asked respondents how concerned they were about the possibility that they, or a 
family member, might be hurt in an attack on the state of Israel/the Palestinian Territories. 
For the NI samples (Protestants and Catholics) the study asked respondents to what degree 
do they agree with the statement: “In certain areas I would be afraid of being identified as 
a Catholic/Protestant”. Further, the answers of each respondent were normalized to a single 
threat perceptions score from 0 (“Not at all concerned”) to 1 (“Extremely concerned”) due 
to scale differences (Israeli Jews and Palestinians were measured on a four-range scale, 
while the NI sample on a five).  
Conciliatory attitudes44 the study referred to the specific context of the conflict for 
each sample. In IL-PA, the study measured attitudes toward compromise with the other 
side at the cost of a major concession. For Israeli Jews, this concession was accepting 
certain border arrangements. And for Palestinians, the concession was forgoing certain 
conditions such as sovereignty over parts of Jerusalem and return of refugees into Israel. 
In Northern Ireland, the study assessed the degree to which respondents supported the 
Stormont Assembly—a key institution arising from the 1998 Good Friday agreement 
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whose suspension from 2002 through 2007 led to political uncertainty. Again, differing 
scale ranges necessitated a normalization of the scale. For all four samples, answers ranged 
from 0 (“Strongly oppose”) to 1 (“Strongly support” the relevant conciliatory policy). 
Across both conflicts the items measuring conciliatory attitudes related to a transition phase 
in the conflict, one that could be expected to change (in IL-PA), or did in fact change (in 
Northern Ireland), a temporary and unstable status quo into a presumably more permanent 
resolution. 
Covariates/Control Variables: The study accounted for a number of variables that have 
been shown to be related to conciliatory attitudes in order to see the extent to which 
conciliatory attitudes were impacted by political violence above and beyond these control 
variables. The study controlled for sex (coded 1 = male, 2 = female), age (years) and 
conciliatory attitudes at wave one.  
Data Analysis 
The AMOS 645 statistical program was used to conduct a multi-group structural equation 
modeling (SEM) analysis. Multi-group analysis allows testing for equivalence across 
groups simultaneously in one model.46 Multi-group analysis is based on the analysis of 
covariance (ANCOVA) structures47 while testing the invariance across groups.  Moreover, 
this SEM method shows mediation or direction of causality by comparing them to their 
possible alternatives (i.e., inverse causality or a direct relationship instead of mediation).  
To examine the invariance or variance of political outcomes among the four conflict-
exposed groups, the study calculated maximum likelihood estimates for all models. These 
were evaluated by: (1) fit measures, namely 2 and degrees of freedom, NFI, TLI, and CFI 
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in combination with RMSEA and ICA48; and (2) comparisons of nested models49 based on 
2 differences for constrained and unconstrained models. In all cases, political outcomes at 
time 2 were predicted whilst controlling for time 1 values on the same measure.   
Results 
Levels of EPV were high in the samples, with 58 percent of the respondents experiencing 
at least one type of exposure assessed. Table 1 presents descriptive statistics of the main 
research variables across the four groups. As can be seen in Table 1, conciliatory attitudes 
are higher for Catholics and Protestants than for Israelis and Palestinians in waves 1 and 2 
(.77, .73, .50, .26 and .80, .70, .48, .29 respectively). Interestingly, over time, conciliatory 
attitudes were higher for Israelis and Protestants, but not for Catholics and Palestinians.  
Table 1 about here 
 
Exposed vs. Not Exposed 
Table 2 presents means and standard deviations of the research variables by EPV. As 
expected, respondents who reported exposure to violence scored significantly higher on 
psychological distress and threat perceptions than those who had not been exposed. 
Exposed individuals were also less likely to exhibit conciliatory attitudes. 
Table 2 about here 
Multi-Group Model  
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The study examined the role played by psychological distress and threat perceptions as 
mediators between EPV and conciliatory attitudes across the four samples. A multi-group 
analysis was employed to examine the proposed model in the four groups. First, the study 
examined whether the constrained model (assuming invariance of regression paths across 
the four groups) fit the data better than a free model, which assumed that no single structure 
fit all four groups. Next, the study presented robust analysis and examined alternative paths 
between the research variables to validate and reinforce the results, and to reject alternative 
explanations. 
Multi-Group Analysis 
First, the study examined a fully constrained model (all regression coefficients were 
constrained to be equal) in comparison with a fully free model (all regression coefficients 
varied across the four groups) to check for invariance in the model variables for all four 
groups. The results suggest the two models adequately describe the data (Fully free model: 
X2=34.88, df=28, CFI= .966, TLI=.898, RMSEA= .024; regression weights constrained to 
be equal across groups: X2=44.21, df=37, CFI= .964, TLI=.919, RMSEA= .022). However, 
the analysis found the difference between the regression-weight constrained model and the 
fully free one to be non-significant, suggesting that there is invariance between the two 
models, and the four groups are similar in their paths (Δx2=9.33, Δdf=9, p=.407). This led 
to the assumption that similar processes are at work among the four groups (See Figure 2). 
Figure 2 about here 
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Next, the study tested for mediation using bias-corrected percentile bootstrapping 
(1000 bootstrap samples). The results show that psychological distress mediated the 
relationship between EPV and threat perceptions (ß=0.02 SE=.006, CI=0.01-0.03, p=0.00), 
and that threat perceptions mediated the relationship between psychological distress and 
conciliatory attitudes (ß=-.0042, SE=.018, CI=-.08 - -.017, p=0.00). 
Robust Analysis 
To eliminate the effect of other possible factors on the explained paths, the study 
constrained each path separately across all four groups (allowing the others to be free). As 
the general variance of the model does not relate to each path, but rather to the total model, 
constraining each path it strengthens the claim that the four groups are equal in their paths. 
It was found that each path (EPV to psychological distress, psychological distress to threat 
perceptions and threat perceptions to conciliatory attitudes) is similar across the four 
groups, as there is no significant worsening of the model fit (Table 3). 
Table 3 about here 
 
Finally, the study examined whether alternative models provide a better fit for the data. To 
do so, an alternative model was considered where EPV leads to threat perceptions leading 
to psychological distress, which then affects conciliatory attitudes (Model 2). The 
regression coefficients are presented in Figure 3. As can be seen, the model fits the data 
poorly, and psychological distress does not affect conciliatory attitudes (Table 4). 
Figure 3 about here 
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Table 4 about here 
 
The analyses largely supported the hypotheses, and described the significant effect 
of EPV on psychological distress and threat perceptions at time 1. This led to decreased 
conciliatory attitudes at time 2 in all four populations studied. The alternative model 
examining different paths of influence between EPV and conciliatory attitudes showed a 
poor fit for the data, reinforcing the suggested model. 
It should be noted that the analyses cannot rule out potential confounding effects 
from two factors which differ between the two case studies: (a) the time elapsed since 
exposure to violent incidents, and (b) the degree of symmetry in power relations between 
the two sides. With respect to the first, at least a decade passed between the end of most 
conflict-related violence in NI and the data collection, while in IL-PA the violence remains 
ongoing. It is not unreasonable to imagine that the passage of time could have tempered 
the association between EPV and psychological distress in Northern Ireland. However, no 
significant differences were found among the four groups regarding our hypothesized 
theoretical model, implying that exposure to conflict-related violence continues to affect 
political attitudes during the long process of peace-building even after a political agreement 
is achieved. 
The asymmetrical nature of the IL-PA conflict can explain the higher levels of EPV 
in the Palestinian sample (see Table 1). The findings also support earlier work indicating 
similar levels of threat perceptions between Israeli Jews and Palestinians. With respect to 
symmetry in power relations, one might presume that their status as the stronger party50 
would give Israeli Jews a greater sense of control, leading to lower perceptions of threat. 
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In Northern Ireland, threat amongst the Protestant majority group might be presumed to be 
higher than the minority group. However, previous research has shown that despite the 
asymmetrical power relations Israeli Jews exhibit high threat perceptions, especially during 
times of intense violence51, as did Protestants in Northern Ireland.52 This perceived threat 
can be linked to potential loss of symbolic status and resources that majority groups 
experience during conflict. Importantly, this perception reflects the fact that the threat, as 
measured here, is a collective threat to the majority group - in this case the Protestants and 
Jews.  In this regard, perceived collective threat is very much a link between individual 
psychological distress because of political violence at the micro level, and wider macro-
level social and political attitudes.   
 
Discussion and Conclusion 
The political science literature aimed at understanding the psycho-political impact of 
exposure to violence on citizens in conflict zones is limited and ambiguous in its findings. 
This paper emphasizes the centrality of personal exposure to political violence – an aspect 
of human experience often ignored in political scholarship – and reaffirms the need for 
psycho-political approaches to the study of how political violence affects the politics of 
peace. The study argues that, in any given context, individuals differ in their experiences 
of conflict, their levels of psychological distress and threat perceptions, and, consequently, 
their political attitudes. In short, the study displays that greater conflict exposure amplifies 
psychological distress, which in turn increases threat perceptions and thereby makes 
individuals less likely to adopt conciliatory attitudes.  
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Drawing on data from four samples representing two case studies, the study 
examines psychological distress and threat perceptions following citizens’ exposure to 
violence in IL-PA and NI. Across both contexts, and among individuals on both sides of 
each conflict, the cross-lagged model shows that EPV increases psychological distress and 
threat perceptions, and that threat perceptions reduced willingness to support peace-
building. To put it succinctly, “violence begets violence.” This is contrary to the view often 
promulgated by both state and non-state actors that violence is a necessary condition for 
political solutions.53 The current data provide powerful evidence that in situations of 
prolonged political conflict, EPV will reduce conciliatory attitudes and therefore the 
possibility of building peace. These findings contribute to the emerging literature on 
barriers to peace54, which highlights how conflict-related violence continues to affect 
political attitudes during the long process of peace-building, even after a political 
agreement is achieved and the violence has stopped.  
These findings accentuate the key role played by collective threat perceptions, and 
reaffirm the importance of individual exposure to violent events in forming subsequent 
political attitudes. One potential explanation for this strong connection between exposure 
and political views is the “shattered assumptions” approach.55 According to this theory, 
traumatic events challenge many of the basic assumptions individuals hold about the world 
or themselves. These challenges trigger enhanced perceptions of the world as threatening, 
and a correspondingly strong desire to reduce this threat (and the fear it induces) through 
increased militancy towards the perceived source of threat—the conflict out-group. 
The findings also contribute to the growing literature on barriers to conflict 
resolution. Recent work by Bar-Tal, Halperin and their colleagues56 elaborates on both the 
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mechanism and the effects of socio-psychological barriers (i.e., ideological conflict-
supporting beliefs and inter-group emotions on conflict-related attitudes). While that 
emerging line of research focuses mainly on cognitive and emotional phenomena, this 
study’s findings point to the powerful role of conflict-related experiences (specifically 
EPV) as a potential barrier to peace-building. Indeed, the fact that EPV continued to be a 
source of psychological distress and threat perceptions among the sample in NI ten years 
after a political agreement, exemplifies how the effects of conflict may continue to interfere 
with progress towards peace despite official settlements. Furthermore, this reaffirms that 
minimizing threat perceptions between groups is central to the development of stable peace 
and reconciliation. 
On the practical level, this study’s findings highlight the importance of efforts to 
help victims of conflict cope with pervasive traumatic experiences despite significant 
separation in time from occurrence. This study points to the importance of the experiences 
of those most affected by political violence for the development of peace in intractable 
conflict. This study’s findings suggest that those who are most exposed to political violence 
are also those who are likely to feel most threatened by the out-group, and therefore the 
least likely to engage in compromise or reconciliation. Moreover, a further consequence of 
this is that these groups can also feel both socially and politically isolated from those 
seeking resolution of the conflict. Thus, while removing the real threat of violence is crucial 
to progress, it is not sufficient. Peace-making also requires ensuring the social and political 
inclusion of those who have been most affected by the violence through acknowledgment 
and legitimization of their losses. 
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Indeed, recent history in both NI and IL-PA 57 shows that agreements between 
policymakers are insufficient for reconciliation and stable peace. Rather, such agreements 
must be accompanied by people-to-people dynamics that both reflect and engender social 
and psychological change.58 Put differently, peace depends on a social infrastructure 
capable of sustaining formal political agreements, which must itself be based on 
recognition of EPV’s psychological and political toll.  
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Tables 
 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics of research variables, and comparison between Israeli Jews, 
Palestinians, and Northern Ireland Catholics and Protestants 
 Israeli Jews 
(N=167) 
Palestinians 
(N=124) 
Protestants 
(N=61) 
Catholics 
(N=68) 
f test 
Variable M SD M SD M SD M SD f P 
Exposure to violence 
(W1) 
.47 .50 .65 .48 .59 .49 .69 .46 4.82 <.001 
Psychological distress 
(W1) 
.08 .10 .32 .12 .06 .13 .09 .16 107.84 <.001 
Threat perceptions 
(W1)  
.74 .25 .74 .25 .69 .22 .71 .24 .707 <.001 
Conciliatory attitudes 
(W2) 
.50 .30 .26 .12 .73 .19 .77 .15 100.06 <.001 
Gender (%) 45.5% 
(male) 
 53% 
(male) 
 50% 
(male) 
 57% 
(male) 
   
Age (years) 46.6 16.64 35.8 12.7
1 
49.8 15.44 46.8 15.17   
Conciliatory attitudes 
(w1)  
.48 .29 .29 .18 .70 .17 .80 .13   
 
 
 
Table 2. Comparison between exposed and non-exposed participants, entire sample 
Entire sample Exposed to political 
violence 
(N=243) 
Not exposed to 
political violence 
(N=177) 
 
Independent variables M SD M SD t P 
Psychological distress (W1) .18 .18 .10 .13 4.76 
2.16 
-1.68 
<.00 
Threat perceptions (W1)  
Conciliatory attitudes (W2) 
.75 
.49 
.25 
.30 
.70 
.54 
.23 
.28 
<0.05 
<0.10 
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Table 3. Goodness of fit indices and model comparison across paths (constrained separately) 
Path CFI 2ΔX Δdf P 
EPV to psychological distress .96 2.70 3 .440 
psychological distress to threat perceptions .96 4.18 3 .243 
threat perceptions to conciliatory attitudes .96 2.44 3 .485 
EPV=Exposure to violence 
 
Table 4. Goodness of fit indices of alternative model 
Model 2X Df CFI RMSE
A 
 2Δ X
(compare
d with 
fully free) 
P 
(compared 
with fully 
free) 
exposure -> threat 
perceptions -> psy distress - > 
conciliatory attitudes 
57.76 37 .897 .0.037 12.861 .169 
EPV=Exposure to violence 
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Figures  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Hypothesized model explaining changes in attitudes towards peace as a result of 
exposure to ongoing conflict 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Psychological distress leading to threat perceptions leading to more negative 
conciliatory attitudes (unstandardized coefficients) 
  
Exposure to 
violence (w1) 
Psychological 
distress (w1) 
Threat 
perceptions (w1) 
Conciliatory 
attitudes (w2) 
 
-.09** .0.04*** 
EPV (w1) 
Psychological 
distress (w1) 
Threat 
perceptions (w1) 
Conciliatory 
attitudes (w2) 
.46*** 
n.s 
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Figure 3. Regression path for all alternative models 
 
 
  
.12*** 
.04* 
EPV (w1) 
Psychological 
distress (w1) 
Threat 
perceptions (w1) 
 
Conciliatory 
attitudes (w2) 
 .02 n.s 
-.07 n.s 
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